

APPENDIX 4

Interview with Quett Masire, former President of Botswana (1980-1998)

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Gaborone, Botswana

NC: Good, so to begin Mr. President I'd like to thank you for your time, taking the time out to participate in this documentary and dissertation work on rethinking what motivates leaders in Africa. And having read your book, I know this will be a fantastic interview. And we really appreciate your time at Yale University.

QM: Thank you, sir.

NC: Mr. President, your autobiography Very Brave or Very Foolish?: Memoirs of an African Democrat was first published in 2006 and provides a detailed behind-the-scenes account of your personal career and the corresponding decision-making process that ensured Botswana's rise from a relatively neglected British protectorate to the political and economic success story that we see today. Can you please explain what motivated you, following your retirement from the presidency in 1998, to want to release this book and what audience are you hoping to reach by doing so, both now and in the future?

QM: Well, I think, um, one thing that motivated me was the situation was changing so fast and so dramatically that my fear was that the next generation would never know what we once were and they would need to have somebody who could have recorded at least part of what life was like in those days and what methods were tried to try to extricate ourselves from the position in which we found ourselves. And so, I thought I should put this in record, both the political development and the economic development.

NC: And are you hoping to reach mostly Botswana's next generation or students around the world with this book?

QM: Well, I definitely did it for Botswana, but many suggestions have been made that I ought to share it with more than just Botswana. Professor [Unknown Name] was inviting me to talk to his third-year students and first-year students in Manchester and Lady Thatcher used to say we were being too modest to share our secrets with the rest of the world. And my stock answer was, "Well, they're there for the taking." Whoever wishes to pick it up may do so. Whoever wants to invite us to ask how we did it and find something out of it that can be of help to him in what he was tackling with, we could make it available. But one thing we should of course know about political and economic development is that each country has got its own inputs. It must develop its own recipes for success. And therefore, what has worked elsewhere might need to be modified to be put in practice at some other place.

NC: Wonderful. Mr. President, in the book you talk extensively about your passion for farming and the fact that you only entered politics reluctantly because you felt there was

a need in the country at the time for capable people to do so. You even write, which was very interesting, “I was frustrated during my years in politics because I saw so many opportunities [in farming] that I could not pursue”(page 327). This reluctance on your part to be a politician is very interesting as it is in direct contrast to the typical, maybe cynical Western perception of African leaders as being overly “power hungry” and motivated by a desire to achieve and maintain political power. And here with you we have a President who is wishing he could be on the farm. Can you please explain to those watching this interview your passion for farming, your reluctance to enter into politics, and how did a reluctant politician eventually become the President of the Republic?

QM: Well, I think it is a question of a Biblical parable of the ten talents or the five talents. I think when we started, really the only thing that has the potential to develop this country was farming. And, um, as somebody with some education I thought I needed to provide the leadership in that sector and I could see many opportunities. I could look across the border and see South African farmers. They were doing so well, even in parts of South Africa which are comparable to Botswana. And so I thought we could, if we would, just sit down and do something about farming in this country. For one thing, our children are going to pour into schools. The schools are going to pour out graduates who needed to do work. And therefore I thought we needed to modernize our farming to meet the requirements of the time. And one sector in our economy that could provide work for everybody. And fortunately, I did not forget the problems of the drought and so forth. By the way, there are ways of evening the bad years versus the good years and making sure that it almost pays, all the work.

NC: So why were you reluctant to enter politics? From the book you get the sense that when you were President you would have rather have been on the farm. Is that the...?

QM: Yes, one thing I like about farming is that you see the results of your labor. In politics you are putting what you think is worth delivering to people, but it takes two to tango. The success or failure is not just because of what you have done, but it is also the result of the reception and the use thereof of what you have delivered. You point the way and hope people will follow that way. And that’s where I found it so tempting now because when I started farming, opportunities that didn’t exist when I started farming were beginning to become abundant. And you just wondered. That was almost heaven on Earth. (Laughter). So that’s the type of thing you make... And you know, a craftsman admires what happens in that sector, and I had this passion for farming.

NC: How does a farmer become President?

QM: The farmer became President because he applied what happens on the farm in politics. On the farm, you don’t reap what you haven’t sowed. In politics, if you want results, you must do things that are likely to bring about those results. And therefore, I would say, yes, my attitude in politics was the same as in farming. I knew that to get results you have to work hard. And to work hard you don’t have to just work like a slave, but to work together with other people, some of whom have better ideas than yourself.

And you are in a privileged position to help them to realize their potential than have the it left alone.

NC: Good. Mr. President, as mentioned, the book does a great job of detailing your decision-making process in trying to address the various challenges that Botswana faced over the years. Thinking back over your 18 years as President of the Republic, which one of your presidential decisions are you most proud of, and what decision, if any, would you change in hindsight?

QM: Well, it's a difficult question because we didn't inherit a growing concern. We had to start from the basic elemental stuff. And every ingredient that we put into it looked so important, and you could see without it things would not be what they are. And therefore, it's very difficult to isolate a decision, whether it was a decision to take an inventory of the resources of the country and see how best to explore and exploit them. Whether it was a question of looking at our customs union, which was based on when we hardly imported anything and we were just getting 1% from that revenue pool. Whether it was a question of dividing the country into concessions and letting people do what they think they can find there and giving them the first opportunity, the first right of refusal to mine or not to mine. And just generally how our politics here, because we were forbearers, we were front-runners. We made our own way in that we neither had the history of running a democratic state, nor did we have any states around us that were democratic. And some of the things we did with a determination to prove the states around us that they were wrong in maintaining the policies they practiced. And of course, they are not fools. They knew that if we succeeded, we would prove them wrong and then their case would be weakened. And so what they could do to bring us down or make us fail in our endeavors, they did that the worst way they could.

NC: Good. Mr. President, you ultimately retired from the Presidency in 1998, handing over power to your Vice-President Festus Mogae. You actually retired from office 18 months from the end of your fourth term and were still relatively popular at the time, so this is a clear example of a leader voluntarily stepping down from power when they actually had the possibility of staying longer. You also mention in your book (pages 133 and 135) that you had wanted to retire several years earlier, but you decided to wait until factionalism within your own party had subsided. Can you please explain what motivated your decision to ultimately retire from office after 18 years rather than continue on indefinitely as President of the Republic as some other Heads of State in other countries have done?

QM: I think I decided to retire the day I was sworn in as the President. Here is one thing again which was happening which was giving Africa a bad name, that ones there would never want to leave. And I was going to prove that wrong because I was going to retire as soon as I thought the time to retire had come. And therefore, we had had a good leader who believed in teamwork. And we therefore had to work very hard to develop a team that would work as well with us around as when we were not around. And so we developed systems. We developed ways of negotiating where our negotiators would go with a mandate, knowing when to stop and when to come back and seek a new mandate.

And therefore, I was sure that we had ingrained this in the whole system. We had inculcated this into the whole mode of our operation that even when I left things would continue to happen the way they were. The danger was if we had a megalomaniac who would take over and say, "Well, yes, chaps, we have done things the way we did, but things have changed, so must we." (Laughter). So I wanted also therefore to find somebody who would nurse this young baby and nourish it in the feed formula we had found, to nourish it to adulthood. And so that was one of my preoccupations. Who do I leave on the saddle? Is he likely to make a success of it? And then that leads to my leaving 18 years out of office. I think I would say, my fourth term was really used mainly as a preparatory stage for leaving office so that I could disappear, but people would not even realize I'm not there. So that was what went on. Um, the man I was going to leave behind was, um, academically the best we could choose, but had no political ambitions. And so I thought, "Well, at least there's a man with a disciplined mind who can do what needs to be done, not what he feels like doing." And so to some extent that was a success. And I thought I should give him 18 months of presidency when both himself, he would realize he was good material for being a president (laughter), and the population also would realize he's not a bad risk. Yeah, so that was the reason of those 18 months.

NC: Wonderful. Mr. President, how did you feel personally in the days following your retirement from the Presidency? What were your thoughts and reflections at that time?

QM: I didn't have time to feel because no sooner had I announced I was going to leave then other people started just wondering what else they would let me do. And I found that there was a concern among Africans, well it was world over, about Rwanda. And the Africans were more concerned perhaps than any other people and they found that this should be investigated. One, to find out could it have been prevented and, if so, why not? Yes. And can it still happen in Rwanda, and if so, how to prevent that from happening again? And could it happen in other countries, and if so, could Rwanda be made a lesson to learn from so that they don't fall into the same rut again. And so I was given six eminent persons to work with. One was the former Chief Justice of India. The other was Mrs. Palme, Lisbet Palme, the wife of the late Prime Minister of Sweden. The third was [name unrecognizable, although Masire is likely referencing Houcine Djoudi], ambassador; he used to be at the UN. And the fourth was a Canadian ambassador by the name of Steve Lewis. And then the fifth was our mutual friend, Toumani Touré, who became my Vice-Chairman. And we dug our heels into it and there were horrifying stories. We found, yes, it was Rwanda's tribal rivalries, but fueled by colonialism. In the past, in the pre-colonial era, yes there were the Tutsis and the Hutus, but it wasn't a fixed thing. As your circumstances improved you became a Tutsi and as your Tutsi circumstances went down you became a Hutu [laughter]. But when the colonialism came, it fixed the situation where they found it. Whoever was a Tutsi when colonialism came remained a Tutsi, him, his children, and his descendants. And so now the battle lines were drawn. And then the second thing was that the Belgians used what they found and exploited it to the best way that they could. They said to the Tutsis, "you're 15% of the population, but, you know, you are the cleverest of the human species [laughter], and we shall send you all the bursaries and what not to improve your capacity to run this

country and so forth.” And that, of course, excited the jealousy of the Hutus. And so it rubbed the Hutus the wrong way. But that was good for as long as they were a colony. Once it became a republic, then the populations counted and the same people switched voices. Now they became the top spokespersons of the rights of the Hutus that, “Yes, you Hutus, you have been used as slaves for years, and so forth and so forth.” So the Hutus felt that they must make sure that they put things right. And so the time of Habyarimana came and economically that’s the best period in the history of that country, or at least before Kagame came. It was the first they had recorded, but there was a Radio *Mille Collines*, Radio of a Thousand Hills, which was just blaring hatred, hatred, hatred! A ship full of merchants came from China! And everybody was really ready to dare somebody to blow the whistle, to chop off these Tutsis’ heads. And the Canadian leader of the gendarmerie there tried to advise against what was happening. The Americans down at the UN turned a deaf ear. They sent a telegram saying, “Please, please, please.” And the telegram found its way either into the rubbish bin or into some other literature which was gathering dust somewhere in the files. And the chief culprit there was my friend, the Secretary-General [name unrecognizable, but Masire is likely referring to Boutros Boutros-Ghali who was UN Secretary General during the genocide and who had earlier, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, “played a leading role in supplying weapons to the Hutu regime (UN chief helped Rwanda killers... 2000)]. And the rest of the international community looked to the Americans to take the lead. The Americans had just suffered a humiliating defeat in Somalia and therefore they were licking their wounds. And at the same time they didn’t encourage anybody to move in and play their role. So that’s why Clinton, take my hat off for him, went there and apologized. Yes. The other thing which accentuated a really bad situation was the church, the Roman Catholic Church. I still wonder why the pope doesn’t find it proper to apologize to the Rwandans because this flair up was periodic, almost every 15 years there would be a flair up, but the church would normally be a place of refuge. And therefore when this flair up came, the people gathered at the church missions to be slaughtered, smitten like flies. And the priest would be there and he would just conveniently disappear and this fellow would come in, and you could see it was a prearranged thing. But that was heart wrenching because there was nothing more betraying than a betrayed trust. Even at the university things went well until the D-day and then the professors, and, above all, you know, the chapels where the doctor of divinity was, they were training priests there. He was one of the culprits. He was one of the ringleaders of, “Let’s kills them all.” However, we looked into all that. We produced a report. We found it was a very difficult thing. And the offenders were almost the whole nation. And therefore we advised them. They had done away with their way of settling disputes. That’s what we call *kgotlas* here. There they’re called the *gacacas*. We said, “Revise the *gacacas*. Have a crash course where you can have people go through what it takes to find somebody’s wrong or right or so forth.” Because sending people to Arusha, they never know what happened. And they will just think, “Well, he’s with another priest who has just taken him away and he is hiding them from justice.” But the *gacacas* would at least meet the people’s emotions that justice is done. Even if they don’t feel they got what they deserved. Because the thing was the impunity with which those things were done. With this we could get rid of this impunity. So, else we thought the courts [inaudible] in Arusha, in so forth. But what we considered were not so serious were dealt with by

gacacas. And during the 10 years of finding their feet, they invited me to go there and I found it was a thriving society. They were trying to forget all the past and doing a good thing and I think we need to take off our hat for Kagame. There is in the whole drama a piece of butchery which took place where Kagame was involved, but he had tried to elect the international community because those who had perpetrated these atrocities had now gone to live among those who had run away from them and therefore used these people as human shields. And Kagame's people said, "Separate these people because we want to deal with them." And I think somebody in the UN thought, "Well, they dare not. They can't go in and kill innocent people." But they had to attack cause they felt there were some people there who, left alone, would just be leaving a festering wound. And so, when we concluded that I was asked to go to the Congo. I was in a hotel room in Addis Ababa when lo and behold first of all a delegation of Congolese came to me to pay a courtesy call and I didn't know why. And later I saw Dr. Salim come to say, "Well, these Congolese have been warring and now they want to start a negotiated peace." So you say, "What were my thoughts after...?" I didn't have time to indulge in [laughter] idle thinking.

NC: You do mention in the book that, I believe it was President Nyerere, who warned you that you would be busier as an ex-President than you were as the President, and you found that to be true.

QM: Yes, that's right. Yes, indeed. President Nyerere gave me a forewarning because the night before I joined the people down below—there was a big celebration to get rid of this fellow [laughter]—and a number of SADC Heads of State had come and made speeches and so forth, especially as I had been chairman of SADC for 16 years. And Mr. Nyerere said, "Well, my friend," because he knew what they had been cooking, what they had been planning, "Well, my friend, you are not going to be free, you might find yourself busier than when you were the President!" Yeah.

NC: Excellent. Mr. President, the theme of political ambition arises several times in your book. In an interesting part, which you briefly mentioned here, you mention that in 1992, when you had to select a new vice-president, you did not want to choose someone that was openly ambitious to be president because, "If one is too keen, you never know if the person will want to leave at the end of his term"(page 90). In your view, has this been a major problem in Africa's political development since independence, the fact that many leaders across the continent have simply been motivated by the desire to achieve and to maintain political power?

QM: Yes, I think so. I think it's both ways. Sometimes people become President because it is the will of the people, and once they are there, they say, "No, it was the will of God [laughter]. I must have been cast in this mold to be a President." And then secondly, we are all creatures of habit, and we develop certain likes and dislikes depending on the circumstances that prevail around us. And you become a President and everybody, I suppose with their tongue in their cheek, say, "Oh, you are a wonderful President. We don't know where this country would be without you. And blah, blah, blah, blah." And that sometimes goes to your head [laughter] and you think, "Indeed if I

leave this country, I'll be letting it down." And so I think people like, if I may call names, people like Nkrumah were cast in that mold. They really genuinely believed that they were the saviors. Ghana's independence had come through them. They were the people who were to see it through to the very end. But, there were others like the Emperor [laughter], who I don't think even himself could have believed he was anything but what he was [laughter]. Bokassa, yeah. And, both ways, the individual themselves with their own ambitions, but also fueled by the impression they get from people that indeed they [inaudible]. We have had in the SADC region four instances where the two-term limit had been adopted by their constitutions, but they tried to find a way of going around the constitutions. People said, "One, because you are the first and therefore you could do it" without many people realizing what he was up to. He got it. But the other three, they were just like dogs barking at the moon [laughter]. Their own people wouldn't let them have it.

NC: These Presidents that want to stay in power indefinitely, what do you feel is the bigger motivation? Is it that being in power gives you access to economic resources or is it that being in power, you're provided with so much esteem and respect from the population, or is it that being in power, they're scared to give up power because they're worried about their personal security: "What will the next guy do to me? I won't be safe." Which one is the bigger motivation, or are all three important?

QM: Hmm. I think the bigger motivation is even what you have not mentioned. The fact that they think they are the be all and end all. And sometimes, of course, we confine these to Africans, but even in the Europeans' history you'll find there is that. Both in the old European history, the middle-ages history, and even in modern history. In modern history, you can take Margaret Thatcher. You can say Kohl of Germany. They went beyond the 10 years. And both of them were giants in their own way. They did well for their countries, but everything has a limit. People had to see how others can do because of the role they knew they would one day die. They say, "Well, when they die, what happens? [Laughter]. Let's see it while their still alive." So I think, yes, some people got there and they have everything and they said, "Well..." I know one President is quoted as saying, "They want me to compete for the Presidency with some other people. If they win, what happens to me? What am I?" He couldn't imagine himself being anything other than a President. Others have, yes, they enjoyed the prestige and enjoyed the where-with-all that goes with it. But some have a sense of mission, yeah. They feel that they have an important role to play. They have a program they have in mind, which they want to see to the very end, and blah, blah, blah. And then of course in Africa what encouraged that also was the fact that we are talking about people who were the first generation of rulers. People who were doing what the people were in power when the whites came failed to do. They got back the country. And therefore they were wonderful chaps. Yeah [laughter]. They were wonderful chaps. They could be kept in life forever. That could have been so. But fortunately or unfortunately life doesn't move that way.

NC: Good. Mr. President, in your analysis, are there any consistent personal or biographical differences that separate those Heads of State that peacefully retire from

office, such as yourself, and those that try to stay in power indefinitely? Maybe something from their upbringing or...

QM: Once upon a time, during my generation, lifespan, that period, when the people in office were almost the first generation of rulers, yes, there were those things which separated them: The Nyereres of this type and the Sekou Tourés of this type. You could see the difference. But now, you know what encouraged this system, this thing, this propensity? It is not only that Africans love power, but also because those who have power wanted to keep them there for their own sake. America could not have been deceived that Mobutu was doing any good thing. Huh? But they would rather have him there doing nothing than let him go to the Russians. So it was part of the Cold War. Yeah. They took the blame, the poor fellows. But there were other contributors to the whole thing.

NC: You mention the difference between Nyerere and Sekou Touré, and they're both part of what you call an -ism: Communism.

QM: That's right.

NC: But they both behaved very differently.

QM: Yeah.

NC: One voluntarily retired and the other one stayed until his deathbed.

QM: Because Nyerere believed. Nyerere's a believer. He believed [laughter], he's like Kaunda, when they happen to believe what is wrong [laughter], they certainly [laughter], they will certainly go to town to prove it's right [laughter]! But, um, people like Sekou Touré, well I don't speak French, so least said soon as demanded.

NC: [Laughter]. But what it is that separates the Nyerere type from the Sekou Touré type?

QM: Hmm. One has a sense of mission. He did what he did because he thought it was good for the people. It may be the wrong thing, but he thought it was good for the people. The other was a person who believed in himself, and he thought he is, he carries out a mission, and that mission must be carried on whether it's right or wrong. And even though, you know the expression, the law of the king and the peasants. According to the "king and the peasants", the king couldn't be wrong. And therefore, you couldn't say even if one is wrong, they're wrong. They'll say, "He's the king." And these are the fellows who, even if they themselves later found it to be wrong, they still couldn't be wrong. There must be something wrong somewhere else, but nothing in them. So, I think that's what separates the Nyereres from the Sekou Tourés.

NC: Mr. President, leaders today in Africa are actually statistically more likely to step down from power than their predecessors were. Should we conclude that leaders today in

Africa don't want to stay in power as much as their predecessors, or should we conclude that leaders today do want to stay in power as much as their predecessors, but that society is now putting so much pressure on them to step down that staying in power is no longer a viable option?

QM: Yeah, I think the divide is not so categorical. Yes, it's both. There may be leaders now who want to stay in power, like I said here [SADC], one succeeded and three failed. And we live in a different world. We're not living in a Cold War era. Where they knew even if they were wrong, big powers would support them. Yeah, that's one. Two, they are no longer heroes who have just wrested their countries to independence, from colonialism to independence. They are now products. They acquired leadership because of the new culture. And therefore they are creatures of that culture. The population will not tolerate it. And even though the population may not rise up in arms, they can anticipate the rising up in arms [laughter], and therefore quit before they see it becomes too hot.

NC: Mr. President, you've mentioned the Cold War a couple times. How much is Western international pressure, as opposed to domestic national pressure, responsible for the increase in leaders voluntarily stepping down from power following the end of the Cold War? Are we talking about a domestic phenomenon or more of an international phenomenon, or a combination?

QM: I think a combination. I think a combination. We tend to benchmark our progress on the Western bench, and therefore, even before you shout, we anticipate [laughter] what you are likely to be shouting about [laughter]. And therefore, we do the right thing [laughter]. But like I said about the three here [SADC] who failed, they failed because of local pressure. Maybe there was an international pressure insidiously seeping in, or international pressure, which is not demonstrated, but it's in the formula, "How is the rest of the world going to look upon us if we allow this to happen?"

NC: Good. Mr. President, you discuss your views on traditional chieftainship several times in your book. You talk about how an autocratic chief can unnecessarily stifle individual innovation and personal freedom and you discuss the need for the nation to switch from hereditary, lifelong, autocratic leaders to democratically elected civilian leaders at all levels of government. You even talk about your own personal experiences with the chief in your home area. Nevertheless, whenever chiefs in Botswana have resigned their chieftainship to run for political office they have been incredibly successful, such as founding President Seretse Khama and Chief Bohoen II who was only able to defeat you for your Parliamentary seat in 1969 because he was still considered by many people in your home area to be their traditional chief. Can you please talk about the degree to which African populations' experience with traditional chieftainship has helped to shape the way the majority have viewed post-independence political leaders? Have they kind of blurred the two distinctions? And specifically, has the fact that chiefs traditionally serve a lifetime tenure conditioned African populations across the continent to accept longer lengths of tenure for their leaders in the post-independence era than Western populations, and is this at all changing with time?

QM: Hmm. I think part of the answer is in your question. The population has conditioned to how the chief used to rule: once he was there, he was there like Queen Elizabeth II, until death do them part. But the societies now realize and know we are living under different circumstances. We have a new set-up. But still out of habit, the chief still has... you see, you could use that power of the chief... if the belief that people have of the chief could be channeled and be used for direct and useful purpose, yes. But the problem where the chief wants to use the tribe for his own purpose, not for the tribe to use him for the tribe's purpose. But the respect for the chief is still great. Yes, and even if they're not so clever or do well. It's a gift of God even if [laughter] he's lacking in certain things, but we must accept it is there [laughter]. It is there. I think that people sometimes tend to be emotional. It cannot be ruled out. Even our President here who is an ordained chief, I think sometimes the temptation for some people to try to use that chieftainship card, but they don't get what happened to Chief Bathoen [laughter]. It doesn't get away with it like that. Yeah, people can say to Ian Khama what they would not say to Chief Bathoen in his face.

NC: Good. We're going to switch cassettes now and then continue.

[TEA BREAK]

QM: I was saying to Mr. Sentele that I'm at an age now where I'm likely to be saying things that should not be said [mutual laughter], and that when I go too far he must cough a little, "Cough, cough, cough," to bring me back into orbit [mutual laughter].

NC: Good. So we just have five more questions. Mr. President, you discuss the positives and negatives of term limits at the dawn of independence in the book, saying, "On the one hand, an incumbent had an edge for re-election even if he or she was not very able; and even one term would be too long for a poor president. On the other hand, if we had a very able person, why should that person not serve a longer term?(page 69). Today, what is your current view on term limits, now that they've swept across the continent, and do you believe that the global trend towards a maximum of two four or five-year terms unnecessarily removes good leaders from power prematurely before their full programs can be enacted?

QM: Hmm. I think that my views then are the same as my views now. They have not changed this bit. And I think two years [Masire means two terms], it's a good compromise. Not to let this fellow that we don't know we want so much remain there forever, but not be too hasty to chase away somebody who is still going to do good work. So it's average. It saves us from being forever with a chap who is not productive, but it also gives us the opportunity to see the full potential of a president who could deliver.

NC: Mr. President, how would you like to be remembered by domestic and international historians in the future, and did you actively take the historical implications of important decisions into account when making them, or were you more concerned with the immediate effects of your decisions?

QM: No, I'm afraid my weakness has been I live from day to day. I don't even keep a diary to make sure that I don't forget what I did. What I do today is good for today, and so be it [laughter]. I didn't also think it in a historical perspective. It's a contradiction because, one, I thought if we set the stage then it should be so helpful for the future if it is the correct one, but if it's the wrong one, it would be a disaster that would continue for the future. But I didn't want to sit down with the feeling that I am creating history. And I felt I was doing the best I could during the time, under the circumstances. I would probably act differently if the circumstances were different.

NC: And today, in reflection, how would you like to be remembered?

QM: Q.K.J. Masire! Remembered as Q.K.J. Masire, as reflected in his book. [Mutual laughter].

Nathaniel: Mr. President, you state very clearly in the book, "Respect must be earned... I have often thought the problem with some chiefs and politicians is that they do not behave as they should, and therefore they do not deserve to be respected, even though they demand it of people"(page 6). To theorize this academically: First, is the desire for respect something that motivates leaders on the African continent? Second, if so, as the African population begins to embrace more modern and/or democratic values, should we expect leaders, in search for their population's respect, to adjust their behavior to the population's emerging modern values? And third, are leaders that are stubbornly and autocratically clinging to power today behaving in a way that ensures that they will not be respected historically in the future?

QM: Well, to start with the wish to be respected is inherent in human beings. We have self-esteem and it's part of what guides our lives so that we don't behave out of character. We have a certain pattern of behavior and people would be shocked if they find we behave outside that. And two, but that can become an obsession. And when it becomes obsession then it is going too far. You want to behave well in a way that you're not necessarily complimented for having behaved well because it's normal; the right way to go about things. But you must not begin going around looking for where is the demonstration of the appreciation of yourself.

NC: Are leaders that are stubbornly trying to stay in power today, are they behaving in a way that means they won't be respected historically in the future?

QM: I don't know them. [laughter]

NC: Well, not anyone specifically, but in general do you think that type of behavior will be respected in the future?

QM: No! I think actually there's very little chance now of the leaders wanting to be expected to be demigods because the situation has changed. Their grandfathers were the ones who liberated the country from the colonial regimes. They are not the first to run

the country as an independent entity. Therefore there's nothing to write home about them. And they should end, some are, behaving like people who have been given an opportunity to serve and they are led to spend a spell discharging that service. And when it comes to the end, just like running a relay race, you say, "Well, my heat has come to an end and now someone else must take the baton. Go ahead."

NC: Mr. President, can you please talk about the importance of relationships between current and former Heads of State on the African continent? As you know, sometimes these relationships can be amicable and sometimes they can be extremely adversarial. Based on your experiences and intellect, what principles do you feel should guide this relationship between a current and former Head of State, and how important are these principles in affecting the likelihood of leaders to step down from power in the first place?

QM: I think leaders should accept that they come in as individuals, they leave, other individuals take over, but they are both dealing with an entity that has no end: a country, a nation. It's there forever and forever. And therefore what has been done is for the good of the country. And even if the man who comes before you has messed up things, you don't need to violently shake the whole nation in order to put it right. You do it as gently as you can to get it in a new direction. And it's important therefore to tailor what you are doing to what has been done before. And if it needs modification, to see that that modification is made to link, not to throw everybody away and start from the [inaudible].

NC: And finally, Mr. President, I'm sure you're familiar with the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and the fact that it semi-annually gives out a prestigious prize to a former Head of State for reasons of good governance while in office, peacefully stepping down from power, and a productive post-tenure. Of course, your former Vice-President won this award. Beyond the accolades, however, do you feel that this prize and similar measures can actually affect the behavior of leaders on the African continent as well as their likelihood of peacefully stepping down from power in the first place?

QM: I think the prize, yes, but what the author of the concept was making it attractive as a post so that there should be competition for the prize, but what has become more important than the prize now is the 88 elements that are taken into account so that every nation sees where it is doing well and where it is lagging behind. It is more or less statistically-based, because the information that goes into the compilation of those statistics are from the World Bank, the national statistics, they're from the teams that are deployed to monitor these things, and therefore it's not a question of "We listen to the music and we find so-and-so more interesting than another." It is reduced to what even a layman can see that it is not guesswork. It's not a question of feeling, it's a question of demonstrable effects that have been put down. Yes, indeed, I'm familiar with this. I'm actually a member of the board of directors of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

NC: Can you imagine a current President today saying, "Well, I want to win this prize so I'm going to behave differently." That the prize can actually have an effect on his decision-making or behavior?

QM: It's not a thing a President would say loudly. He can say it quietly and inwardly [laughing] because he doesn't want anybody to think he's influenced by the prize [laughter]. But he would like people to think if he has done well, it's just by virtue of him being essentially a good person and therefore deserving the prize.

NC: Mr. President, once again I'd like to thank you for your time. You've been very generous and this interview is a fantastic contribution to this project and it's an honor and a pleasure to meet with you today. I respect you not just as a President, but as a man and somebody who has led an honorable life, and I just want to thank you so much on behalf of the Department of Political Science at Yale University.

QM: You are very kind to me. My political opponents would beg to differ with you. [Mutual laughter]. Yes. No, certainly I found the discussion interesting. It has helped me to go back in time, to relive the past and take a sentimental journey back into the past.